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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CLAUDE L. HEINER and DAN H.
HUNTER,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.

No. 880204-CA
Category 15

S.J. GROVES & SONS CO.,
a Minnesota corporation; and
WESTERN STATES MINERAL CORP.,
a Utah corporation,
Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to
the provision of Utah Code Annotated §78-2A-3(2)(j).
On December 23, 1987 the Honorable Boyd Bunnell granted
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on the basis that Plaintiffs'
Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.

The Memorandum Decision was entered as an order on

January 6, 1988 and the Notice of Appeal in this case was filed on
February 3, 1988.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW
Did the lower court err in granting Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint for failure to state a claim upon
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which relief can be granted based upon the assumption that a
subpurchaser of mining claims can enter into a separate agreement
with the original vendor and significantly modify the original
sales agreement (to which it was not a party) even though such
agreement significantly defines the obligations between the
original purchaser and subpurchaser and such modification, if
valid, extinguishes all rights of the original purchaser to
receive royalty payments from the subpurchaser?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action which was commenced by Plaintiffs against
defendant S.J.

Groves & Sons Co. and its successor in interest

defendant Western States Mineral Corp.

(hereinafter collectively

referred to as "Defendant"), seeking damages for the alleged
wrongful breach of a "Purchase Agreement" entered into between
Plaintiffs and Defendant.

After hearing argument, the lower court

determined pursuant to the various agreements entered into between
these parties and others that there was no claim stated by the
plaintiffs upon which relief could be granted.

Accordingly, the

court granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
The procedural facts in this case are undisputed.
Essentially, the case involves a number of mining claims located
in Emery County, Utah.

In May of 1975 plaintiffs Claude L. Heiner

and Dan H. Hunter entered into an agreement entitled "Option to
Purchase and Purchase Agreement" (hereinafter the "1975
Agreement") with James R. Dickert and Robert Eddy.

At this time

the plaintiffs agreed to assume five coal leases for the coal mine
known as Dog Valley Mine which are the subject of this action.
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The 1975 Agreement is attached herein as Exhibit "A" to the
Appendix.

It is this document which is th$ underlying basis of

Plaintiffs1 present claim.
In the 1975 Agreement Plaintiffs paid $30,000 cash for the
assignment of the leases and for certain equipment and agreed to
pay to Dickert and Eddy an overriding royalty of 25 cents per ton
of coal mined plus 1% of any money over $15 per ton received upon
the sale of any coal.
The Agreement contained the following clause:
Buyers hereby agree that from and after the
transfer to them of said leases they will enter onto
the subject lands and commence mining operations for
coal with reasonable dispatch and to continue such
mining operations with reasonable diligence until all
of the reasonably mineable and merchantable coal on, in
and under the subject land has been mined, removed and
sold. Merchantable coal shall include only that coal
that can be mined, removed and sold at a reasonable
profit. In the event of the occurrence of an event or
events beyond the reasonable control of the Buyers then
Buyers shall be excused from performing the obligations
imposed upon them under this paragraph during the
continuation of such event and to the extent made
reasonably necessary by such event. (1975 Agreement,
paragraph 3 ) .
The 1975 Agreement also provided language as to termination.
It stated:
In the event Buyers shall voluntarily decide to
terminate their interest under any of said leases or in
the event of the default of Buyers or their assignees
under any of said leases which default shall remain
uncorrected after thirty (30) days* actual notice of
such default, Sellers shall be entitled to the
reassignment of the leases and Buyers agree to use
their best efforts to secure the approval or consent of
the Utah State Land Board to such reassignment. (1975
Agreement, paragraph 5).
The parties also agreed that they could assign their rights
under the Agreement and that any such assignees would have the
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rights and obligations contained in the 1975 Agreement.

(1975

Agreement, paragraph 8).
On March 1, 1976 the successors of the plaintiffs and
defendant S.J.
Agreement".

Groves & Sons Co. entered into a "Purchase

(Hereinafter referred to as the "1976 Agreement").

The Agreement provided that the plaintiffs would sell to the
defendant the net assets subject only to assumed liabilities under
the terms of the Agreement.

(1976 Agreement, Paragraph 2.1). A

copy of the 1976 Agreement is contained in the Appendix of this
Brief as Exhibit "B". The purchase price for the net assets was
two million dollars together with a clause relating to an
overriding royalty on behalf of the plaintiffs.

It stated:

An overriding royalty to be reserved in the
Assignment of the Leases (or reassigned by Buyer) to
vest Western States Properties, [the successor of
plaintiffs], its successors and assigns, with a royalty
on all coal produced and sold from the Lease Property
by Buyer, its successors and assigns, as follows: 20
cents per ton on the first 2.5 million tons and 30
cents per ton on all coal produced and sold thereafter.
[1976 Agreement, paragraph 3.1(b)]. (Emphasis added).
In another portion of the contract the following language is
contained relating to the 1975 Agreement:
Buyer will from and after the Closing perform and
pay as and when due all obligations required under said
Option to Purchase and Purchase Agreement dated May 28,
1975. (1976 Agreement, paragraph 7.10). (Emphasis
added).
Finally, Section 9 of the Agreement was entitled "Termination
of Agreement" and contained various remedies for termination by
either the buyer or the seller.

Essentially, the Buyer

(Defendant) was only allowed to terminate under the terms of this
Agreement for the failure of the Sellers to satisfy the material
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conditions precedent to the closing of the transaction.

On the

other hand, the Sellers were given the option of terminating for
any default by the Buyer if it was not cured within thirty days.
(1976 Agreement, paragraph 9.1).
Paragraphs 9.2, and 9.3 also apply to remedies in the event
of termination.

These provisions state:

9.2. If the contract is terminated pursuant to
9.1(i), Sellers shall be obligated to restore and
return to Buyer all the payments made to Buyer under
this Agreement. Buyer shall reassign to Sellers the
Net Assets and all parties shall thereupon be released
from any further obligation under the Agreement.
9.3. If Sellers elect to terminate pursuant to
9.1(ii), the (a) Sellers shall be released from all
obligations under this Agreement; and (b) Sellers shall
have the right to damages as provided in law for loss
of their bargain by reason of the default of Buyer.
As of 1981, the majority of the original parties to these
Agreements had changed by various assignments or successions.
Virginia Dickert had succeeded to the overriding royalty interest
of her deceased husband James Dickert.
still owned his overriding royalty.
assumed the position of S.J.

Robert Eddy, however,

Western States Minerals Corp.

Groves & Sons Co. which was the

original buyer in the 1976 Agreement.

Plaintiffs Claude Heiner

and Dan Hunter reassumed the interest of Western States Minerals
Corp., which was the seller in the 1976 Agreement.
In 1981 Defendants ceased mining coal at the Dog Valley Mine.
On October 1, 1981 a third agreement was entered into between
Virginia Dickert and Robert Eddy as the "Sellers" and Western
States Minerals Corp. as the "Buyer".
the "1981 Agreement").

(Hereinafter referred to as

This Agreement was entitled "Amendment to

Option to Purchase and Purchase Agreement." A copy of this
-5-

Agreement is contained herein as Exhibit "C".
The parties to that Agreement agreed, among other things,
that Western States (Defendant) would not be in default of the
1975 Agreement irrespective of whether Western States mined coal,
so long as Western States paid minimum royalties of $3,000 per
month to Dickert and Eddy.

(Paragraph A ) .

They also agreed that

once the total sum of $1,250,000 had been paid as a minimum
royalty that no subsequent monthly royalty payment would be
required and that any money paid as a minimum monthly royalty
would be treated as a production royalty payment under paragraph 4
of the original Agreement.

(Paragraphs C and D of 1981

Agreement).
Finally, the Agreement provided that the Buyers1 obligation
to make minimum monthly royalty payments under Paragraph A of the
Amendment or production royalty under Paragraph 4 of the original
Agreement would terminate upon reassignment of the leases to the
Sellers pursuant to Paragraph 5 of the Agreement.

All other

terms, conditions and covenants would remain in full force and
effect.
It is assumed that between 1981-1985 minimum monthly payments
were paid to Dickert and Eddy.
were paid to Plaintiffs.

No overriding royalty payments

In 1985, Defendants reassigned the

underlying mining leases back to Dickert and Eddy.
In 1987 this Complaint was initiated against Defendant on the
basis that it had failed to continue its duty to mine under
Paragraph 4 of the 1976 Agreement and that such failure resulted
in damages to the plaintiffs of an amount not less than $1
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million•

A copy of the Complaint is attached herein as Exhibit

"D".
On December 22, 1987 oral arguments were presented by the
parties as to Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss.

Subsequently, on

December 23, 1987 a Memorandum Decision was entered by the lower
court.
"E".

A copy of this Decision is contained herein as Exhibit

The lower court found that the 1976 Agreement obligated the

Defendant to Dickert and Eddy as far as its mining operation but
did not obligate it in any way to the plaintiffs.

Thus, under the

Court's reasoning since the defendant entered into a separate
agreement with Dickert and Eddy thereby satisfying them as to any
mining requirement the plaintiffs had no remedy available to them
in that there was no independent duty as to the plaintiffs for
continuous mining.
Furthermore, the Court found that the 1976 Agreement was
clear and unambiguous, that the overriding royalty to the
plaintiffs would only occur as to any coal mined and that there
was no agreement that a minimum or continuing mining obligation
existed as between the plaintiffs and the defendant.

The lower

court therefore found that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.

It is from this order that the

present appeal is taken.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT^
1.

The lower court erred in concluding that there was no

independent obligation between the plaintiffs and the defendant
in this case and that by satisfying Dickert and Eddy the
defendant was therefore relieved as to any obligation to the
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plaintiffs.

The court misconstrued the various transactions as

one of assignment rather than sale.

The court failed to recognize

that independent agreements were entered into in the 1976
Agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendant which were separate
and apart from the obligations existing in the 1975 Agreement.
2.

The lower court essentially found that a novation had

occurred and that the original 1975 Agreement had been superceded
by the 1981 Agreement.

This finding was incorrect since the

plaintiffs were not made parties to the 1981 Agreement and their
rights therefore could not be extinguished.
3.

The lower court failed to recognize that the defendant

had an obligation to act in good faith towards Plaintiffs and to
protect the overriding royalty interest of Plaintiffs and that
entering into a separate agreement with Dickert and Eddy violated
this duty.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
THERE WAS NO INDEPENDENT OBLIGATION RUNNING
BETWEEN PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANT AND THAT
DEFENDANT COULD THEREFORE EXTINGUISH ANY
LIABILITY BY MAKING A SIDE AGREEMENT WITH
DICKERT AND EDDY.
While the Agreements themselves and the facts leading up to
them are essentially undisputed, the interpretation of these
Agreements is greatly disputed.

Under the interpretation of the

defendant, the 1975 Agreement established all of the rights and
liabilities relating to the coal leases.

Defendant views the 1976

Agreement as merely an assignment of those rights and liabilities
with the plaintiffs being mere conduits to convey the rights and
-8-

liabilities previously granted to them in the 1975 Agreement.
Under this theory, therefore, in order to satisfy the mining
obligation it was only necessary to go back to the original
grantors, Dickert and Eddy, and to cut a deal with them in order
to avoid any liability under the various agreements.

Defendant

asserts, therefore, that once the 1976 Agreement was entered into
between Plaintiffs and Defendant that its only obligation was to
pay to Plaintiffs an overriding royalty in the event that any
coal was produced.

By satisfying Dickert and Eddy under the 1981

Agreement no further obligation to mine coal existed and therefore
Plaintiffs' overriding royalty was extinguished.

This

characterization of the Agreements was essentially adopted by the
lower court.
On the other hand, Plaintiffs claim a different
interpretation of these Agreements.

Under the arguments advanced

by Plaintiffs, the 1975 Agreement established both liabilities and
rights.

In 1976, a separate Agreement was entered into between

Plaintiffs and defendant which was not an assignment of the 1975
Agreement and which contained its own rights and liabilities.

It

was the position of the plaintiffs that the 1976 Agreement was
controlling except as to that particular portion of the 1976
Agreement which required the defendant to perform and pay when due
all obligations required under the 1975 Agreement.
7.10 of the 1976 Agreement).

(Paragraph

As part of this "obligation"

Defendant was required to mine the property as long as it was
commercially profitable as defined in the 1975 Agreement.
Thus, Plaintiffs in their Complaint alleged that while
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Defendant may have fully satisfied its obligations to Dickert and
Eddy, this did not eliminate the independent obligation going to
the plaintiffs to continue mining and to pay the overriding
royalty.

Hence, since the plaintiffs were not part of the 1981

Agreement, defendant was still liable to them for the damages
caused in terminating the mining operation and in failing to pay
the overriding royalties.
The lower court failed to make the necessary analysis of the
language in these contracts and simply decided that the conduit
theory of the defendant was correct and that plaintiffs were
therefore entitled to nothing once Dickert and Eddy had agreed
that no further mining was required.

This interpretation is

clearly erroneous.
Preliminarily, it should be noted that Plaintiffs did not
assign the 1975 Agreement to defendant but rather sold defendant
the subject coal leases.

Paragraph 2.1 of the 1976 Purchase

Agreement provides:
Sellers agree to sell to Buyer and Buyer agrees to
purchase from Sellers the Net Assets . . . .
Paragraph 1.4 of the 1976 Purchase Agreement defines the "net
assets" to include the subject coal leases.
While the coal leases themselves were clearly assigned to the
defendant, such assignment does not affect the characterization of
the 1975 and 1976 Agreements.

If the assignment of the coal

leases themselves was all that was required, then the entire 1976
Agreement would have been redundant and unnecessary to establish
the rights and obligations of the parties.

In reality, where a

lessee reserves an overriding royalty when making a purported
-10-

assignment of a mineral lease, the "assignment" is in legal effect
a sublease.

Robinson v. North American Royalties, Inc., 463 S.2d

1384 (La. App.

1985).

The assignments were only a portion of

the total documentation required under the 1976 Agreement and did
not constitute an assignment of the 1975 Agreement.
The characterization of these two Agreements is critical to
the determination of this case.

If, as the defendant argued and

the court concluded, the 1976 Agreement was merely an assignment
of the interest and obligations of the 1975 Agreement then
defendant could have extinguished any obligations to the
plaintiffs by simply satisfying Dickert and Eddy.

On the other

hand, if the 1976 Agreement created separate obligations and
liabilities to the plaintiffs, then the 1981 Agreement with
Dickert and Eddy was of no consequence to those separate
obligations unless the plaintiffs were parties to the
modifications.
An analysis of these various documents shows that the
position of the plaintiffs is correct and that their Complaint
clearly stated a cause of action.

It is obvious from even a

cursory examination of the 1975 and 1976 Agreements that the two
differed significantly in their terms, rights, and obligations.
The only reference in the 1976 Agreement to the 1975 Agreement is
contained in Paragraph 7.10 which basically states that defendant
undertakes to perform and pay when due all obligations required
under the 1975 Agreement.

This language is specific and limits

any interrelationship between the two Agreements to the defendant
assuming the financial obligation of the prior contract.
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It does

not, however, give the defendant any further rights beyond those
contained in the 1976 Agreement.
The 1976 Agreement represents what is commonly known as a
subpurchase in which the owner of real property resells his
interest to another rather than merely assigning a prior contract.
As noted by one treatise:
A subcontract by a purchaser to sell his interest
under a contract of sale is not an assignment, but a
separate and independent contract between the purchaser
and his assignee and a subpurchaser. . . .
* * *

A subpurchase creates between the original vendor
and subpurchaser a privity of estate, but does not, in
the absence of agreement, create a privity of
contract.
* * *

Unless the vendor assumes the obligation, a vendor
not in privity of contract with a subpurchaser is not
liabl* to the subpurchaser for the fulfillment of the
contract between the purchaser and the subpurchaser.
(92 C.J.S., Vendor and Purchaser, §314, p.
202-03) .
See also, Greenbaum v. Smith, 409 A.2d 621 (D.C. App.
1979); Campbell v. Kerr, 618 P.2d 1237, 1243 (N.M. 1980).
An analysis of the 1976 Agreement shows that it was in effect
a subpurchase with the plaintiffs being in the position of the
original purchasers and the defendant being in the position of the
subpurchaser.

Thus, there was no privity of contract between

Dickert and Eddy and the defendant except as to the extent that
defendant assumed any obligations existing in the 1975 Agreement.
Before a subpurchaser can be held to answer to
the vendor there must be an explicit agreement on his
part to do so, or conduct from which the law implies
such a promise. A subpurchaser does not assume
personal responsibility to the vendor because he knows
-12-

of the contract between the vendor and purchaser and
that it will be forfeited if he does not pay on the
subcontract, or because the payment under the
subcontract corresponds with those under the original
contract, or because the subpurchaser has the right to
make payments directly to the vendor or agrees that his
payments should be paid to the vendor. 92 C.J.S.,
Vendor and Purchaser, §314, p. 205. (Emphasis
added).
With this distinction in mind, an examination of the various
agreements reveals the following:

First, defendant agreed to pay

to the plaintiffs an initial sum of compensation for the
assignment of the leases and for the equipment.

In the event that

the closing had not occurred because of the failure of Plaintiffs
to satisfy the various conditions of the 1976 Agreement defendant
would have been entitled to terminate the Agreement and all the
parties would have been returned to their original status.
Once the agreement was completed, however, defendant was
limited as to its actions.

Defendant, was required to pay to

Dickert and Eddy the royalty percentage required in the 1975
Agreement.

Under the terms of the 1975 Agreement it was required

to continue mining such coal until all of the "reasonably mineable
and merchantable coal on, in and under the subject lands had been
mined, removed and sold." (1975 Agreement, paragraph 3).

At the

same time, under the 1976 Agreement defendant was obligated to
pay Plaintiffs an overriding royalty on this same amount of coal
mined.

Thus, the 1975 Agreement provided the privity necessary to

require defendant to pay Dickert and Eddy and also defined the
conditions for mining which was to occur as to Plaintiffs'
overriding royalty pursuant to the 1976 Agreement.
Second, it is fundamental that the documents which convey
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mineral interests are subject to the same general rules that
govern interpretation of any contractual agreements.
Schwartz, 354 N.W.2d 685 (N.D.

1984).

Miller v.

As such, where a reference

to another writing is made in a contract for a particular and
specified purpose, such other writing becomes a part of the
underlying contract only for that specified purpose.

Lincoln

Welding Works v. Ramirez, 647 P.2d 381 (Nev.

See also,

Weber v. Anspach, 473 P.2d 1011 (Or.

1982).

1970).

The parties in this case intended that certain of the
conditions and covenants existing in the 1975 Agreement (original
royalty payment and obligation to mine requirement) apply to the
relationship of the parties in the 1976 Agreement but all other
conditions and covenants were to be governed exclusively by the
1976 Agreement.
An example of this principle can be seen by examining the
termination clauses of the 1975 and 1976 Agreements.

The 1975

Agreement provided in Paragraph 5 a procedure for termination of
the leases and reassignment to Dickert and Eddy.

The 1976

Agreement, however, stated that if the defendant terminated
unjustly then the plaintiffs would have the right to damages as
provided in law for the loss of their bargain by reason of the
default of the buyer.

(1976 Agreement, Paragraph 9.3).

Thus, defendant cannot claim the benefit of the termination
provision of the 1975 Agreement since a separate and distinct
termination provision was provided in the 1976 Agreement as to
it only.

The fact that the plaintiffs in this case chose to

make a more restrictive subpurchase agreement than the original
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agreement is of no consequence as long as the original agreement
is fully satisfied.
In real estate transactions such a concept is common.

An

original seller and buyer may sell a house for $40,000 at 8%
interest with no prepayment penalty or late fees-

Subsequently,

that purchaser may resell the property to a third party for
$90,000, at 10% interest, with prepayment penalties and with late
fees.

In such a case, the subpurchaser cannot claim the benefit

of the first contract since he is not a party to it.

While the

subpurchaser may have agreed, for example, to make direct payments
to the first purchaser this still does not entitle him to claim
the other benefits of the original contract.

The principle in

this case is no different.
The type of action which is sought in this case is best
illustrated by the case of Smith v. King, 722 P.2d 796 (Wash.
1986) (en banc).

In that case the owners of an apartment house

sold the property to the first purchasers under a real estate
contract (Contract 1 ) . The purchaser price was zero down, with
monthly interest installments of $452 and a balloon payment of
$57,000 due on September 30, 1981.
Subsequently, the first purchasers resold the property to the
second purchasers by a second real estate contract (Contract 2).
As part of the purchase price the second purchaser expressly
assumed and agreed to pay all amounts still due to the owners on
the first contract ($57,000 plus interest installments).

In

addition, the second purchasers agreed to pay the following to the
first purchasers: $9,000 down, monthly interest installments of
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$200 and a balloon payment of $24,000 due on June 20, 1986.

Thus,

the purchase price on Contract 2 totalled $90,000 plus interest.
After the second purchasers assumed the property they
abandoned it and allowed it to be vandalized.

Ultimately the

original owners foreclosed on both the first and second purchasers
and received the property back.

The first purchasers filed a

crossclaim against the second purchasers claiming damages because
of the forefeiture.

The court in sustaining a judgment in favor

of the first purchasers stated the following:
Unless the real estate contract between the first
purchasers and the second purchasers (Contract 2)
provides otherwise, the first purchasers may sue the
second purchasers for actual damages resulting from the
latter1s breach of contract. The first purchasers are
entitled to be placed in as good a pecuniary position
as they would have been had the second purchasers not
breached the contract. Thus, where the second
purchasers1 breach caused the first purchasers1
interest in the subject property to be forfeited, the
first purchasers are entitled to damages equal to the
unpaid portion of the purchaser price payable to the
first purchasers under the contract. Id. at 799.
(Emphasis added).
Here, when the 1976 Agreement was consummated, defendant was
obligated by the various terms of the 1976 Agreement to perform
including the obligation to pay directly to Dickert and Eddy the
amount of royalty required under the 1975 Agreement.

The parties

understood that this royalty was conditioned upon the ability to
commercially mine the property.

In addition, defendant was

obligated to pay to Plaintiffs an overriding royalty on all ore
mined.
Had defendant gone to Plaintiffs and shown them that it
was unable to commercially mine the property then any further
royalties would be excused under both agreements.
-16-

Instead,

however, defendant bypassed Plaintiffs entirely and went directly
to Dickert and Eddy for the purpose of eliminating any requirement
to mine at all.

This action assumed that there was no obligation

to the plaintiffs to continue mining the property under a
commercial standard and that the sole obligation rested with
Dickert and Eddy*

As noted earlier, however, the 1976

definitional requirement of mining became an integral part of the
1976 Agreement and was binding between Plaintiffs and defendant
just as much as it was originally between Plaintiffs and Dickert
and Eddy,

It was therefore necessary for defendant to satisfy not

only Dickert and Eddy as to any cease of mining operations but
also to satisfy the plaintiffs.

This it failed to do.

The lower court relied upon a Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals decision of Piamco Inc.

v. Shell Oil Co., 799 F.2d

262 (7th Cir. 1986) . The lower court in construing this case
stated:
The Court quite agrees with the reasoning set
forth in the case of Piamco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co.
handed to the court by counsel for the plaintiff at
oral argument and which case is a federal case from the
Seventh Circuit. In that case the court found and
stated that there can be no doubt that as a general
matter overriding royalty obligations end with the
termination of the estate from which the interests were
carved, absent an express contractual provision to the
contrary. The court went on to state that the
agreement betwen these parties itself manifests a clear
intention to bind Shell to make such royalty payments
regardless of the fate of the undermining leases.
In this case, we have no clear intention stated in
the agreement that this would be the case. On the
contrary, the agreement is very clear and unambiguous
that the royalty that may be due to the plaintiffs will
be paid on all coal mined and sold by the defendant or
its assigns. There was no express agreement to pay any
sort of a minimum or to continue mining indefinitely as
contended by the plaintiffs. (Memorandum Decision, pp.
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4-5).

(Emphasis added).

The Court misconstrued the position of the plaintiffsPlaintiffs did not contend that they were entitled to a mininum
royalty if mining had been legitimately terminated.

Neither did

Plaintiffs contend that defendant was required to indefinitely
mine the property in order for Plaintiffs to receive a royalty.
Rather, Plaintiffs contended that defendant was obligated to mine
the property as long as the property could be mined in a
commercially feasible manner and that such obligation continued in
spite of the 1981 Agreement attempting to modify the underlying
definition.

Plaintiffs have never contended that they are

entitled to an overriding royalty if the underlying leases are
legitimately terminated because of the conditions contained in the
1975 Agreement.
Defendant in this case has made no claim that it was
unable to commercially mine these properties.

Instead, it has

relied entirely upon its 1981 Agreement with Dickert and Eddy as
justification for eliminating any overriding royalty of the
plaintiffs.

Thus, under the various documents defendant was

still liable to mine the property and Plaintiffs are entitled to
be able to prove what damages, if any, they suffered because of
the premature termination of such mining.
The lower court therefore erred in granting defendant's
Motion to Dismiss.
POINT II
THE 1981 AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BETWEEN
DEFENDANT AND DICKERT AND EDDY HAS NO
LEGAL EFFECT UPON THE RIGHTS OF PLAINTIFFS.
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The lower court concluded that because of the side agreement
entered into by Defendant and Dickert and Eddy in 1981 no further
obligation to mine existed.

In effect, the lower court concluded

that the 1981 Agreement entitled "Amendment to Option to Purchase
and Purchase Agreement" was valid and that any rights which
existed under the original 1975 Agreement to the plaintiffs had
been extinguished.
The conclusion of the lower court was incorrect.

The parties

to the 1975 Agreement were Dickert and Eddy and the plaintiffs.
The parties to the 1981 Agreement were Dickert and Eddy and the
defendant.

The plaintiffs were neither notified of the

negotiations for such agreement nor did they agree to any
modification.
Thus, the only way in which defendant would be entitled to
enter into a modification would be if the defendant had assumed
the position of the plaintiffs by way of assignment.

The

documents do not show that the 1975 Agreement was assigned to
the defendant enabling it to unilaterally renegotiate it with
Dickert and Eddy.
In essence, the 1981 Agreement was an attempted novation
modifying the 1975 Agreement.

It is fundamental, however, that

there can be no novation with its accompanying substitution of
parties unless the original debtor, original creditor, and new
debtor have all entered into such an agreement.
McKay & Co., 381 P.2d 261 (Colo.

1963).

Reilly v. Cook,

See also, Kinderknecht

v. Poulos, 707 P.2d 184 (Wyo. 1985), where the court found a
subsequent agreement entered into between the original vendor,
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original vendee, and subsequent vendee was valid and that the
original terms of the first contract still remained in full force
and effect unless they had been specifically modified in the
second agreement.
In the instant case not only were the plaintiffs not made
parties to the 1981 Agreement but the question of the plaintiffs'
overriding royalty was never addressed.
The defendant effectively eliminated the concept of "royalty"
by obtaining the agreement of Dickert and Eddy that no mining need
to performed.

However, the payments to Dickert and Eddy continued

under the guise of "minimum monthly payments"—not based upon the
normal royalty percentages.

Hence, Defendant kept Dickert and

Eddy happy while at the same time eliminating Plaintiffs1 claim
for overriding royalty since no coal was mined to which a royalty
would have been owed.
For these reasons, therefore, Plaintiffs cannot be bound by
the 1981 Agreement and are entitled to an opportunity to present
to a factfinder their claim of damages for defendant* failure to
mine the property in accordance with the 1975 Agreement.
POINT III
THE DEFENDANT VIOLATED ITS DUTY OF
GOOD FAITH TO PROTECT THE INTERESTS
OF THE PLAINTIFFS TO AN OVERRIDING
ROYALTY.
Between 1981 and 1985 no coal was mined from the five
properties.

Nevertheless, Dickert and Eddy were paid a minimum

monthly payment in lieu of a royalty during this period of time.
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, were paid nothing since defendant
took the position that they were only entitled to a royalty for
-20-

actual ore taken from the properties.

Thus, in effect, Dickert

and Eddy contracted with the defendant to eliminate the overriding
royalty provision of the 1976 Agreement by changing the method of
payment from a royalty based upon ore taken from the ground to a
minimum monthly payment where no mining was required.
This type of conduct attempting to circumvent the plaintiffs
royalty right in analogous to cases in which a sublessee allows a
lease on property to lapse thereby eliminating any overriding
royalty of its lessor and then going directly to the owner of the
property for a new lease.
This principle can be seen in Independent Gas and Oil
Producers v. Union Oil Co. of California, 669 F.2d 624 (10th Cir.
1982) . In that case the owner of property executed an oil and gas
lease to Union Oil Company.

Union thereafter assigned the lease

to the Independent Gas and Oil Producers but retained an
overriding royalty.
and plugged it.

Subsequently, Independent abandoned the well

Thereafter, an agent of Independent Gas and Oil

entered into a new lease agreement with the owner of the property
covering the same wells but this time having no overriding royalty
of Union Oil.

Union Oil claimed an interest in this second lease

on the basis that the effort of Independent Gas and Oil Producers
was merely a subterfuge to eliminate its valid overriding royalty
and that it should still be entitled to a royalty under the first
lease.
The lower court found in favor of Union Oil and held that the
second lease was not valid.

The Tenth Circuit Court affirmed.

The Court stated:
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Oklahoma courts have ruled that a lease assignment
expressly subjecting lease extensions and renewals to
an overriding royalty interest converts a new lease
procurred by the assignee into a renewal of the old one
to which the reserve royalty attaches. This rule has
been applied even where the new lease did not issue
until the old one had expired for lack of production.
Id. at 627. (Citations omitted).
The Court then spoke of the fiduciary obligation that Independent
Gas and Oil Producers had to Union in relation to its overriding
royalty.

The Court stated:

The fiduciary obligations impliedly created by the
terms of such a lease assignment form the basis for the
rule. Where an assignment provides that subsequent
lease extensions and renewals are subject to an
overriding royalty, the assignee stands as a quasi
trustee vis-a-vis the assignor and must exercise the
utmost faith in protecting the latterfs interest in the
leasehold. Consequently, any attempt by the
fiduciary-assignee to procure rights antagnoistic to
those of his assignor will be defeated. Id.
(Emphasis added).
An Oklahoma case relied upon by the Tenth Circuit, Probst v.
Hughes , 286 P. 875 (Okla. 1930), involved an instance where an
assignee of a lease allowed it to terminate and then went to the
owner of the property and entered into a separate lease cutting
out the original lessee.

The defendants in that case claimed that

the lease automatically terminated when the assignee ceased
production of the oil and such termination operated as a
termination of the plaintiffs' overriding royalty.

They further

claimed that since the second lease was entered into subsequently
to such termination it constituted an independent transaction
unaffected by plaintiffs' claim of an overriding royalty interest.
The Court rejected this claim and held that the second lease
was still subject to the original lessor's overriding royalty.

In

giving its reasons for such decision the Court noted the following
-22-

principle:
If a person who has a particular or special
interest in a lease, obtains a renewal thereof from the
circumstances of his being in possession as tenant, or
from having such particular interest, the renewed lease
is, in equity, considered as a mere continuance of the
original lease, subject to the additional charges upon
the renewal, for the purpose of protecting the
equitable rights of all parties who had any interest
either legal or equitable, in the old lease. Id. at
878.
These same principles apply herein.

if defendant did not

wish to continue operating the mines it was obligated to modify
not only the 1975 Agreement with Dickert and Eddy but also to
enter into an agreement with the plaintiffs as to their overriding
interest.

Both the 1975 and 1976 Agreements were based upon a

good faith effort to require continued commercial mining of the
properties.

Defendant did not have the discretion to eliminate

that obligation as to the 1975 Agreement by agreeing to pay
minimum monthly payments while at the same time ceasing to make
any payments on the 1976 Agreement on the basis that no ore was
mined.

This type of effort is a mere subterfuge to circumvent the

valuable right of Plaintiffs in obtaining an overriding royalty on
the production.

Neither law nor equity allows such a result to

occur.
It is fundamental that the law generally imposes a duty to
perform contractual obligations in good faith.
and Carpet Co.
Corp.

Leigh Furniture

v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 311 (Utah 1982); Rio Algom

v. Jimco, Ltd., 618 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1980); W.P.

Construction Co.

Harlin

v. Utah State Road Commission, 19 Utah 2d 364,

431 P.2d 792, 793 (Utah 1967).

Thus, an implied covenant of good

faith forbids arbitrary action by one party that disadvantages the
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other.

See, W. P. Harlin Construction Co.

v. Utah State Road

Commission, supra, 431 P.2d at 793.
Accordingly, courts endeavor to construe contracts so as not
to grant one of the parties an absolute and arbitrary right to
terminate a contract.

Midwest Management Corp.

N.W.2d 896, 913 (Iowa 1980); Miller v. O.B.
Minn.

152, 297 N.W.

v. Stephens, 291

McClintock Co., 210

724, 729 (1941); Fulcher v. Nelson, 273 N.C.

221, 159 S.E.2d 519, 522 (1968); 1 S. Williston, The Law of
Contracts §105, at 418-19 (3d Ed.

1957); 17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts

§496 (1964).
These same principles apply here.

Plaintiffs, when entering

into the 1976 Agreement with Defendant, rightfully assumed that
the prior 1975 conditions of mining would always be binding on
Defendant.

Plaintiffs could not anticipate that Defendant would

attempt to bypass them by eliminating the mining requirement of
the 1975 Agreement.

Such secretive action of Defendant violates

its duty to act in good faith towards Plaintiffs and to not
actively attempt to defeat Plaintiffs' overriding royalty
interests.
The lower court failed to recognize this good faith
requirement and held that the 1976 mining requirement language was
essentially illusory and was completely dependent upon the whims
of-Dickert and Eddy regardless of any wrongful conduct by
Defendant.

This faulty analysis requires reversal.
CONCLUSION

The plaintiffs in this case do not dispute the concept that
if the defendant had legitimately terminated its mining
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obligations then any overriding royalty would have been
automatically extinguished.

The sole question in this case,

therefore, becomes whether or not under the 1976 Agreement
defendant legitimately terminated its obligation to mine.

The

lower court concluded that there was no standard of mining imposed
upon the defendant by the plaintiffs and that essentially
defendant could arbitrarily mine or not mine depending upon their
own whim or caprice as long as Dickert and Eddy did not
complain.
This reasoning, however, ignores the fact that the 1975
Agreement was incorporated and used as a standard of measurement
for the 1976 Agreement.

The plaintiffs justifiably relied upon

the mining obligation requirement believing fully that defendant
would have to continue the mining operation unless it could show
that it was commercially unprofitable.

The obligation to

Plaintiffs is separate and apart from the obligtion to Dickert and
Eddy and thus the commercial mining standard was applicable to the
overriding claim of Plaintiffs on an equal footing, even though it
was not specifically repeated in the 1976 Agreement.
The lower court's failure to recognize this distinction came
about by its failure to analyze the difference between an
assignment and a subpurchase.

The defendant was not "stepping

into the shoes" of the plaintiffs as claimed by the defendant in
the lower court.

The plaintiffs were not merely a conduit in

which the rights of Dickert and Eddy were conveyed to the
defendant.

Rather, the plaintiffs were separate parties which had

contracted with the defendant for separate rights and obligations.
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There was no privity of contract between Dickert and Eddy and the
defendant except as to the obligation of the original royalty.
As a matter of law, therefore, the Agreements clearly stated
a claim upon which relief could be granted.

At a minimum if there

is any ambiguity in the intentions of the parties based upon these
three Agreements such matters should be resolved in summary
judgment or in a full-blown trial.

In no case, however, should

this case be dismissed for failure to state a claim since the
legal interpretation of the trial court is erroneous when based
upon fundamental principles of contract and real estate law.
For these reasons, therefore, the decision of the lower court
should be reversed and the matter should be remanded for further
proceedings.
Respectfully submitted this

day of December, 1988.
r
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APPENDIX

OPTION TO PURCHASE
AND PURCHASE AGREEMENT

This Option to Purchase and Purchase Agreement
made and entered into this

'«* 0

day of May, 1975, by

and between James R. Dickert and Robert Eddy, hereinafter collectively referred to as "Sellers," and Dan H*
Hunter and Claude L. Heiner, hereinafter referred to as
"Buyers."
W I T N E S S E T H :
WHEREAS, Sellers hold leases currently in good
standing from the State of Utah on property known as
the Dog Valley Mine located in Emery County, State of
Utah, copies of said leases designated and referred to
1003
as SL 062712, ML 19231, ML'W*fr3> ML 18783 and ML 17687
being attached hereto, and covering the land described
in Exhibit A attached hereto, and
WHEREAS, Sellers are willing to give to Buyers and
Buyers desire to obtain from Sellers an option, and in
the event of exercise of the option, to purchase said
leases upon the terms and conditions hereinafter set
f o r th #

"
Exhibit "A"

-2NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises
and the mutual covenants and conditions hereinafter set
forth it is agreed as follows:
1. Option to Purchase.

In consideration of the

payment of $10,000,00 by Buyers to Sellers concurrently
with the execution of this Agreement, the receipt of
which is hereby acknowledged, Sellers do hereby grant
to Buyers for a period of three (3) months from the
date hereof an option to purchase the said leases*
2.

Exercise of Option, The option herein granted

shall be considered exercised by Buyers upon their
having within the option period deposited in the United
States mail, postage prepaid, certified mail, a written
notice of the exercise of the option and payment upon
the transfer to them of the said leases of the further
sum of $20,000.00.
3. Assignment and Transfer of Leases and
Equipment.

Upon the exercise by Buyers of the option

herein granted as above provided Sellers will assign
and transfer to Buyers the said leases unencumbered, in

-3good standing and subject to no past-due royalties or
to royalty interests other than those in favor of the
State of Utah under said leases and including all mines
and workings located on the property, together with an
assignment of unencumbered title to all of the
equipment and machinery now located upon the premises,
excluding only the front end loader, the Ford truckr
the diesel shuttle buggy, the Case crawler tractor, the
stockpile of coal and all diesel fuel and powder
located on the premises, all of which shall remain the
property of Sellers who shall have the right to remove
and retain the same. Sellers agree that any and all
fines, penalties, assessments and charges by any
governmental authority or otherwise which have been or
may be hereafter assessed upon th6 mine or which are
related to its operation for periods prior to the date
of this Agreement shall not be the obligation of Buyers
and Sellers will hold Buyers harmless therefrom.
Any such fines, penalties, assessments and charges
which relate to the period after the date of this
Agreement shall be and remain the obligation of

4Buyers.

In additionr Sellers hereby agree to give all

necessary and appropriate assistance to Buyers in
obtaining a transfer of said leases to Buyers' names.
Buyers hereby agree that from and after the transfer to
them of said leases they will enter onto the subject
lands and commence mining operations for coal with
reasonable dispatch and to continue such mining
operations with reasonable diligence until all of the
reasonably minable and merchantable coal on, in and
under the subject lands has been mined, removed and
sold.

Merchantable coal shall include only that coal

that can be mined, removed and sold at a reasonable
profit.

In the event of the occurrence of an event or

events beyond the reasonable control of the Buyers then
Buyers shall be excused from performing the obligations
imposed upon them under this paragraph during the
continuation of such event and to the extent made
reasonably necessary by such event.
4.

Royalty.

Buyers hereby agree to pay to Sellers

or their nominee on or before the 28th day of February

-5and on or before the 31st day of July of each year, on
the basis of the semi-annual accounts for the coal sold
in the preceding six-month periodf an overriding
royalty of 25 cents per ton of coal mined from the
leased premises as sold, said royalty to be computed on
the same volume as the royalties due the State of Utah
under said leases plus 1% of all amounts by which the
price-received by Buyer for coal loaded at the mine
site shall exceed $15.00 per ton of coal so removed
from the leased premises and sold (i.e., if the price
received for coal loaded ready for hauling at the mine
site by Buyer, but excluding any transportation
charges, is $20.00 per ton then the royalty would be
25 cents per ton plus 1% of the $5.00 or 5 cents per
ton), it being understood that in no year will Sellers
receive a royalty payment less than $12,000.00 until
total royalties of $100,000.00 shall have been paid,
including $28,000.00 representing the initial
$10,000.00 option payment and $18,000.00 of the
$20,000.00 payment to be made upon exercise of the

-6option (the remaining $2,000.00 of said $20,000.00
payment being the payment for the machinery and
equipment), it also being understood that payments in
any year in excess of actual royalties due based upon
production shall be considered as advance royalty
payments to be applied upon production of coal
subsequent to payment in full of said $100,000.00.
5.

Termination of Leases.

In the event Buyers

shall voluntarily decide to terminate their interest
under any of said leases or in the event of the default
of Buyers or their assignees under any of said leases
which default shall remain uncorrected after thirty
(30) days1 actual notice of such default, Sellers shall
be entitled to the reassignment of the leases and
Buyers agree to use their best efforts to secure the
approval or consent of the Utah State Land Board to
such reassignment.

In such event, Sellers shall also

be entitled to the original machinery or equipment, if
any, which shall be on the premises at the notice of
default, it being understood that Buyers shall have no

-7obligation to maintain or preserve any of such
machinery or equipment on the premises.
6.

Inspection of Records.

Sellers will make

available to Buyers at reasonable times the accounts
and records of prior production and activity of the
mine together with all drill hole information available
to Sellers, including logs, reports and coal analysis
information.

Sellers will also deliver to Buyers the

mine map and timber plan submitted by Sellers to the
Bureau of Mines.

Buyers shall make available for

inspection by Sellers at reasonable times the accounts
and records of their production during the term of this
Agreement.
7.

Enforcement of Agreement.

The parties agree

that should they default in any of the covenants or
agreements contained herein, the defaulting party shall
pay all costs and expensesr including a reasonable
attorneyfs fee which may arise or accrue from any
remedy in law or in equity in enforcing this contract
or in pursuing any remedy whether such remedy is

-8pursued by filing a suit or otherwise,
8.

Successors and Assigns.

It is understood that

the stipulations aforesaid are to apply to and bind the
heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns
of the respective parties hereto.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the said parties to this
Agreement nave hereunto signed their names, the day and
year first above written*
SELLERS:

James R. Dickert

Robert Eddy
BUYERS:

Dan H. Hunter

Claude L. Heiner

PURCHASE AGREEMENT

THIS AGREEMENT dated as of March 1, 1976, between
S. J. Groves & Sons Company, a Minnesota corporation, with
offices at 10000 Highway 55 West, Minneapolis, Minnesota
55441 ("Buyer"), and Western States Coal Corporation, a Utah
corporation, 2330 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah
84115, and Western States Properties, a Utah partnership,
with offices at 2330 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah
84115 ("Sellers"),
W I T N E S S E T H :
In consideration of the mutual covenants and
agreements herein contained, the parties agree as follows:
1.

Definitions,

In this Agreement, the following terms shall have
the following defined meanings:
1.1

"Leases or Leased Property" means State of

Utah coal lands leases ML 19231, ML1003, ML18783, ML17687,
and SL062712, copies of which are attached hereto as Exhibit
"A-l," pertaining to lands situate in Emery County, Utah,
containing 440 acres more or less, together with all permits, licenses, approvals or other leases appurtenant thereto
or used in connection therewith, all as more particularly
described in Exhibit "A-l."

Exhibit "B

1.2

"Other Property Rights" means (1) the railroad

siding property designated and referred to as the Aurora
Railroad Siding, at or near Aurora, Utah; (2) the State of
Utah Special Use Lease Agreement No. 365 for a parcel adjacent
to the Lease Property; (3) a well; and (4) Application No.
45337 to appropriate water, all as more particularly described
on Exhibit "A-2" attached hereto.
1.3

"Equipment11 means the mining and earth-moving

equipment and machinery, fixtures, vehicles, rolling stock,
trackage, other personal property, buildings, and leasehold
improvements described in Exhibit "A-3," together with a
quantity of supplies at least equal to amounts listed on
Exhibit "A-3a" attached hereto.
1.4

"Net Assets" means (1) the Leases; (2) the

Other Property Rights; and (3) Equipment.
1.5

"Assumed Liabilities" means charges and

obligations of Sellers, liens against the Leases, Other
Property Rights and Equipment and burdens on production to
be assumed by Buyer, in addition to the purchase price
herein provided to be paid, all as specified in Exhibit "A4."
1.6

"Offset Liabilities" means such Assumed

Liabilities as are to be paid directly by Buyer and charged
against the Purchase Price as specified in Exhibit "A-5."
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1.7

"Excess Liabilities" means liens against the

Leases, Other Property Rights and Equipment and burdens on
production in excess of those specified in Exhibit "A-4" and
Exhibit "A-5."
2.
2.1

Purchase and Sale,
Sellers agree to sell to Buyer and Buyer

agrees to purchase from Sellers the Net Assets subject only
to Assumed Liabilities on the terms of this Agreement.
2.2

Promptly upon request of Buyer, Sellers

shall execute a Memorandum of Agreement in recordable form
for recordation by Buyer substantially as set forth in
Exhibit "A-6M attached hereto.
2.3

A Closing shall be set at the offices of

Davis, Graham & Stubbs, 2600 Colorado National Building,
Denver, Colorado, as soon as possible after Buyer gives
Sellers verbal notice that conditions of Closing are satisfied
but not later than thirty (30) days from the date of this
Agreement, or at such other time and place as may be agreeable
to both the Sellers and the Buyer.
3.
3.1

Purchase Price.
The total purchase price for the Net Assets

shall be:
(a) Two Million Dollars ($2,000,000), adjusted
as in Section 3.2 provided, to be paid in certified
funds at Closing as follows:
(i)

One Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00)

to Western States Coal Corporation for purchase of
the Equipment (Exhibit "A-3 M ), the Other Property
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3.2

Payments at Closing shall be reduced by

the amounts of the following %
(a)

Offset Liabilities, if any, as set forth

on Exhibit H A-5 M and Excess Liabilities, if any, if not
discharged by Sellers at or prior to Closing.
(b)

Taxes and other deferred costs, if any,

attributable to the possession and operation of the
Leased Property by Sellers prior to date of Closing.
(c)

The fair market value of any Net Assets,

except Leases, not transferable to Buyer because of
title failure or otherwise.

In the event that one or

more of the Leases is not transferable because of title
failure or otherwise Buyer may, at its option, terminate
this Agreement by notice to Sellers and the obligations
of Buyer and Seller hereunder shall thereupon terminate.
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(d)

All costs borne by Buyer under paragraph

4 to satisfy conditions required of Sellers for Closing.
4.

Disclosures by Sellers.

4.1

Sellers shall furnish to Buyer with, or make

available to Buyer within ten (10) days following execution
of this Agreement:
(a)

Lease files and other documents of title

in the possession of or available to Sellers showing
title of the Net Assets in Sellers.
(b)

Copies of all contracts, and other

obligations of Sellers, including all matters described
in Exhibits "A-l" and "A-2 # " affecting the use of the
Net Assets, the sale of production from the Leased
Property and the rights of Sellers in and to the Net
Assets.
(c)

Copy of the approved mining plan or

plans for the Leases, and all permits, licenses and
authorizations of government authorities for the conduct of mining operations on the Leased Property.
(d)

All geological and geophysical maps,

surveys, core analyses, assays, logs and related data
in the possession of or available to Sellers showing
reserves, disposition and chemical qualities of coal
deposits.
(e)

All books and records of Sellers regarding

development and operation of the Leases.
(f)

All hydrological data, reports, test

results, and other data relating in any way to the
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permeability of the formation from which water included
in Other Property Rights is being produced or to the
determination of the yield of the well from which such
water is being produced, and all approved well permits
for such well.
(g)

An executed purchase agreement relating

to the purchase of the Aurora Railroad Siding by Sellers.
(h)

A copy of the partnership agreement of

Western States Properties.
Sellers hereby represent and warrant that the
information and documents provided or made available pursuant
to subparagraphs

(a) through

(h) above and to the best of

Sellers 1 knowledge are complete and there are no other
material documents or information which have not been
disclosed or made available to Buyer.
5.

Obligations of Sellers.

5.1

Buyer's obligations under this Agreement are

conditioned upon the following:
(a)

Sellers' delivery to Buyer at the Closing:
(i)

Assignments and Bill of Sale in

form appended hereto as Exhibit

M

A-7 M

to vest

Buyer with good and marketable title to the Net
Assets subject only to the Assumed Liabilities;
(ii)

All documents described in Section

5.2.
(b)

Performance by Sellers of all obliga-

tions described in Section 4.1;
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visual examination and face samples

(to be taken on

ASTM standards with split samples provided for independent
testing by Sellers) that mineable coal exposed under
ground on any major part of the I seam is not less than
11,500 BTU f s + 200;
(d)

Reasonable satisfaction of Buyer, by

test conducted prior to Closing at times convenient to
Sellers, that well is physically capable of delivering
at least 20 gpm of water on sustained pumping

(12 hour

test) and is available for use by Buyer pending issuance
of permit by state;
(e)

Reasonable satisfaction of Buyer that

legal access exists to the Leased Property and to the
Aurora Siding.
If Buyer is not satisfied that the foregoing
conditions in this Section 5.1 have been met at or prior to
Closing, Buyer shall have the option, at Buyer's sole election:
(i)

To terminate this Purchase Agreement;

provided only that this option is not available to
Buyer for a failure of access to the Aurora
Siding;
(ii)

To allow Sellers additional time,

not in excess of sixty (60) days, to satisfy said
conditions; or
(iii)

To close, satisfy said conditions

itself, and deduct the cost of satisfaction,
including reasonable attorneys 1 fees, not to
-7-

exceed Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00) , from
the price payable at Closing; provided only that
Buyer's acceptance of the Net Assets at the Closing
shall not discharge Sellers from responsibility
for their warranties under Section 7.

In any

event Buyer shall be limited to the remedies described within this paragraph (which must be exercised at or prior to Closing) for the failure of
Seller to satisfy any obligation or condition
described or referred to in this paragraph with
the exception of the warranties under Section 7.
5.2

At or prior to Closing, Sellers shall provide

Buyer the following:
(i) Copy of a resolution of the stockholders and Board of Directors of Western States
Coal Corporation certified by the Secretary thereof
and agreement of the Managing Partners of Western
States Properties, authorizing the sale of the Net
Assets on the terms of this Agreement and (in the
case of the shareholders of Western States Coal
Corporation) a resolution showing concurrence of
the owners of not less than two-thirds of the
outstanding stock.
(ii) Certificate of the Secretary of
Western States Coal Corporation giving the names
of the officers of that company and their authority
-8-

to execute and perform this Agreement in accordance
with the provisions hereof*
(iii)

Opinion dated the Closing Date from

legal counsel for Sellers to counsel for Buyer
that (a) Western States Coal Corporation is a Utah
corporation duly incorporated, organized.

-8a-
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to execute and perform this Agreement in accordance
with the provisions hereof.
(iii)

Opinion dated the Closing Date from

legal counsel for Sellers to counsel for Buyer,
substantially in the form of Exhibit "A-8" attached
hereto, that (a) Western States Coal Corporation
is a Utah corporation duly incorporated, organized,

8a.

validly existing and in good standing under the
laws of the State of Utah; (b) Western States
Properties is a Utah partnership duly organized,
validly existing and in good standing under the
laws of the State of Utah; (c) the appropriate
officers of Western States Coal Corporation and
the Managing Partners of Western States Properties
have all necessary authority to convey all of
Sellers9 interest in the Net Assets to Buyer and
perform all other obligations required of Sellers
on the terms of this Agreement; and (d) that the
transactions herein contained are exempt from the
provisions of the Utah Bulk Sales Act, Utah Code
Annotated § 70A-6-101, et^ seq.
(iv)

From and after the date of this

Agreement Sellers shall allow Buyer and employees
of Buyer access to the Leased Property to conduct
limited surveys*
5*3

Following the Closing, Claude L. Heiner, as

an individual, shall serve as a consultant to Buyer to
assist Buyer in the management of operations on the Leased
Property.

In pursuance thereof, Claude L. Heiner shall be

reasonably available as requested from time to time as his
schedule shall permit, but not more than two (2) days per
week and for a period not to exceed three (3) months.
Claude L. Heiner shall receive for such services compensation
in the amount of $150 per day plus expenses.
-9-

5.5

filers shall provide Buye^^ith the names o£

potential customers contacted by Sellers for the sale of
coal from the Leased Property and neither Sellers nor Claude
L. Heiner or Dan H. Hunter shall, directly or indirectly,
acquire coal mineral interests, by leases, assignment,
purchase or otherwise within thirty (30) miles of the Leased
Property for a period of two years from the date hereof/
except to the extent that such acquisition may be hereafter
approved by Buyer.

Sellers and Claude L. Heiner and Dan H.

Hunter agree to use their best efforts to keep available for
Buyer the services of present employees including a certified
coal mine superintendent and other technical ratings needed
for Buyer1s operation, as well as contractors, agents, coal
purchasers and haulers and preserve for Buyer the good will
of customers, suppliers and others having business relations
with Sellers.
6.

Obligations of Buyer.

At or before the Closing, Buyer shall:
6.1

Provide a copy, certified by the Secretary of

Buyer, of a resolution of the Board of Directors of Buyer
authorizing the officers of Buyer to purchase the Net Assets
of Sellers on the terms of this Agreement, to assume the
burdens of existing contracts of Sellers, to pay the purchase
price in the manner herein provided, execute all of the
documents and perform all of the obligations required of
Buyer under this Agreement.
-10-
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counsel for Buyer that Buyer is duly incorporated under the
laws of Minnesota, is in good standing and through its
officers has power and has all necessary authority to commit
itself legally to and fully perform all of the obligations
assumed by Buyer under this Agreement
6.3

Provide assumption agreements substantially

in the form of Exhibit HA-9,f by which Buyer assumes obligations
of Sellers and agrees to hold Sellers harmless from any
further liability with respect to the assumed obligations,
if any.
7.

Warranties of Sellers.

Sellers jointly and severally warrant unto Buyer
that as of the date hereof and as of the date of Closing:
7.1

Title to the Leases is vested in one or both

of the Sellers free of any liens, encumbrances, overriding
royalties, production payments or contract obligations
created or permitted by Sellers, except as specified in
writing in the Exhibits to this Agreement.

Sellers make no

other warranty with respect to title to the Leases.
7.2

To the best of Sellers1 knowledge, informa-

tion and belief, Buyer shall not be obligated for any royalty
or production payment to Sellers or to any third party except
as shown in Exhibit "A-4", as provided in Section 3.1(b)
hereof, and pursuant to that Agreement referred to in Section 7.10.
7.3

To the best of Sellers1 knowledge, information

and belief, no condition now exists that will prevent Buyer
from continuing mining operations in the manner conducted in
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the past by Sellers or on an expanded basis as contemplated
by Buyer.
7.4

Equipment listed in Exhibit

f,

A-3,f is in

reasonably good and serviceable condition, and will remain
in such condition to the date of Closing/ ordinary wear and
tear excepted.
7.5

The well on the parcel adjacent to the Leased

Property (which is included in the Other Property Rights),
has to date produced water'for the mining operations heretofore
conducted by Sellers as shown in the well report and other
data furnished to Buyer by Sellers and Buyer shall have the
right to test the same at its expense at the earliest reasonable time available following execution of this Agreement.
7.6

To Sellers1 best knowledge, information and

belief, there is access to the Leased Property and Aurora
Railway Siding adequate for coal mining operations heretofore
conducted by Sellers.
7.7

Sellers will use their best efforts to obtain

clear title to the Aurora Railroad Siding, near Aurora,
Utah, as more fully described in Exhibit "A-2" upon Closing
or within a reasonable time thereafter and Sellers will
transfer to Buyer such title as they shall have been able to
obtain within such period.

Sellers will at Closing convey

title to the siding property by a Warranty Deed in the form
of Exhibit "A-IO" attached hereto and provide Buyer with a
policy of title insurance in the amount of Fifty Thousand
Dollars ($50,000.00), subject only to the exceptions and
conditions referred to in the preliminary title report,

Order No. U-15161, dated February 17, 1976, a copy of which
is attached hereto as Exhibit "A-ll," and thereupon Sellers'
obligations under this Section 7.7 shall be fully performed.
7.8

To their best knowledge, information and

belief, there are no actions, suits, or proceedings pending
or threatened against or affecting the Sellers at law or
equity or before any federal, state, municipal or other
governmental department, commission, board, bureau, agency
or instrumentality, affecting the Leases or the Sellers'
title to the Net Assets which have not been disclosed to
Buyer.
7.9

Each Seller further represents severally with

respect to facts within its knowledge that all material
facts have been disclosed to Buyer regarding (1) the financial
condition and liabilities, actual or contingent, of each
Sellerf insofar as the same may adversely affect Buyer's
rights hereunder in the Net Assets; (2) the explorationf and
development of the Leased Property, marketable quality of
the coal; and (3) any other material facts reasonably
bearing upon the value of the Net Assets.
7.10

Sellers represent that as of the date

of Closing all of Sellers' obligations under that
certain Option to Purchase and Purchase Agreement between Sellers and James R. Dickert and Robert Eddy
dated May 28, 1975 are in good standing and all
-13-

obligations ox
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performed and current.

^ ^.

^

Buyer will from and after the Closing

perform and pay as and wbriyjinrL nil ohTinjriH tirn required
under said Option to Purchase and Purchase Agreement dated
May 28, 1975.

Buyer shall indemnify and hold harmless

Sellers from any and all claims, suits and liabilities
relating thereto arising from acts or defaults of Buyer from
and after the Closing; and Sellers shall indemnify and hold
Buyer harmless from any and all claims, suits and liabilities
relating thereto arising from acts or defaults of Sellers
prior to the Closing.
8.

Transfer of Operations.

Between the date of this Agreement and the Closing,
the Sellers are authorized to continue operations in the
manner hertofore conducted, to deliver coal to Kennecott
Copper Corporation at McGill, Nevada, pursuant to existing
purchase order and to incur and pay any and all liabilities
arising .in the ordinary course of business, provided only:
8.1

That Sellers keep and maintain all buildings,

machinery, equipment, fixtures, vehicles and other property
of Sellers in good operating condition and repair.
8.2

That Sellers will not execute any security

agreement, lien, encumbrance, mortgage, deed of trust or
other burden upon the Net Assets, without the prior written
approval of Buyer; and
8.3

That Sellers shall not enter into or assume

any contract affecting the Net Assets except as reasonably
required in the normal course of business without prior
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written consent of Buyer.
8.4

Income and costs relating to operations on

the Leased Property shall be transferred as of the close of
the night shift on the date of Closing (the "transfer date").
All coal on the Aurora Siding on the transfer date shall be
segregated on the siding, shall remain the property of
Sellers and shall be removed by Sellers within a reasonable
time period not to exceed five (5) days.

All coal on the

Leased Property, whether broken at the transfer date or not,
belongs to Buyer.

All wages, other operating costs, insurance

premiums, taxes and royalties shall be adjusted to the
transfer date to the end that Sellers bear all costs on
operations occurring before the transfer date and Buyer
bears all costs on operations occurring thereafter.
9.
9.1

Termination of Agreement.
The parties may terminate their obligations

under this Agreement at the following times and for the
following reasons:
(i)

At Buyer's election for the failure

of Sellers to satisfy all material conditions
precedent to Closing;
(ii)

At Sellers1 election (exercisable

jointly not severally) for default by Buyer in any
obligation under this Agreement if Buyer does not
cure the default within thirty (30) days following
-15-

written notice from Sellers as hereinafter provided of the existence and nature thereof.
9.2

If the contract is terminated pursuant to

9.1(i), Sellers shall be obligated to restore and return to
Buyer all of the payments made to Buyer under this Agreement.

Buyer shall reassign to Sellers the Net Assets and

all parties shall thereupon be released from any further
obligations under the Agreement.
9.3

If Sellers elect to terminate pursuant to

9.1(ii) :
(a) Sellers shall be released from all obligations under this Agreement; and
(b) Sellers shall have the right to damages
as provided in law for loss of their bargain by reason
of the default of Buyer.
9.4

On termination of this Agreement for any

cause, Buyer shall return to Sellers all technical geological,
geophysical, assay, repoduction and related data furnished
to Buyer, and all such data collected or developed by Buyer
with respect to the Leased Property and any portion thereof
and the operation thereof, in connection with this Agreement.
10.
10.1

Closing Costs.
Each party shall bear its own expenses of

preparation, authorization, execution and performance of
this Agreement except as specifically provided in this
Article 10.
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written notice from Sellers as hereinafter provided of the existence and nature thereof.
9.2

If the contract is terminated pursuant to

9.1(i), Sellers shall be obligated to restore and return to
Buyer all of the payments made to Buyer under this Agreement.

Buyer shall reassign to Sellers the Net Assets - a n d —

^the Option and all parties shall thereupon be released from
any further obligations under the Agreement.
9.3

If Sellers elect to terminate pursuant to

9.1(ii):
(a) Sellers shall be released from all obligations under this Agreement; and
(b) Sellers shall have the right to damages
as provided in law for loss of their bargain by reason
of the default of Buyer.
9.4

On termination of this Agreement for any

cause, Buyer shall return to Sellers all technical geological,
geophysical, assay, repoduction and related data furnished
to Buyer, and all such data collected or developed by Buyer
with respect to the Leased Property and any portion thereof
and the operation thereof, in connection with this Agreement.
10.
10.1

Closing Costs.
Each party shall bear its own expenses of

preparation, authorization, execution and performance of
this Agreement except as specifically provided in this
Article 10.
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10.2

Costs arising from the Closing shall be

borne by the parties in accordance with the following:
(i) Sales taxes and recording fees, if
any, and costs of securing approvals for transfers
of leases, contract obligations, licenses, permits,
and bonds, by Buyer*
(ii) Transfer taxes, if any, and recording
costs of removing Excess Liabilities of record, by
Seller.
10.3

Sellers and Buyer represent that they have

not used the services of any Broker or other third party in
connection with this transaction and that no one is entitled
to a commission or finderfs fee in connection with this
transaction.

Should such a fee nevertheless be claimed by

any person not authorized so to act by buyer or Sellers, any
liability or expense incurred by reason of such claimed fee
will be the responsibility of the party responsible therefor
or on whose behalf such person acted or purported to act.
11.
11.1

General Provisions.
All representations, warranties, indemnities,

covenants and agreements herein contained shall survive the
Closing and shall continue thereafter unless or until barred
by applicable law.
11.2

Buyer may designate a subsidiary corporation

to acquire the Net Assets of the Sellers pursuant to this
Agreement and thereafter to conduct exploratory, development
and mining operations under the Leases and Other Property
-17-

Rights.

It is understood and agreed that Buyer may assign

this Purcnase Agreement to, or direct the assignment of any
or all Net Assets from Sellers or others directly to said
subsidiary, and by any such assignments vest in said subsidiary
all rights and obligations of Buyer under this Purchase
Agreement, and in said Net Assets, as fully as would be the
case if said subsidiary were an initial party to this Agreement*
Any such assignment shall be expressly subject to this
Agreement, and Buyer shall remain primarily liable upon all
the obligations of this Agreement the Same as if no such
assignment had been made or if assignment had been made
directly to Buyer.

No other assignment of this Agreement

shall be made to any other party without the prior written
consent of the other parties hereto, which consent shall not
be unreasonably withheld.

Subject to the foregoing, all

covenants hereof inure to the benefit of and are binding
upon the successors and assigns of each party.
11.3

Notices required or permitted by this Agreement

will be deemed to have been given when made in writing, and
transmitted by certified mail, postage and charges pre-paid,
return receipt requested, addressed to the party or parties
entitled thereto as follows:
If to Buyer:
S. J. Groves & Sons Company
10000 Highway 55 West
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55441
Attention:

Herbert A. Beltz,
Vice President
-18-

with copy to:
Gary Hutchinson, Manager
S. J. Groves & Sons Company
1780 South Bellaire
Denver, Colorado 80222
If to Sellers:
Claude L. Heiner and
Dan H. Hunter
2330 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah

84115

with copies as may be directed;
or to such other address as any party may designate by
notice to the other parties as herein provided.
11.4

Buyer hereby agrees and warrants, as a part

of the consideration for the sale to it of the Net Assets as
herein provided, that it has inspected the Net Assets on its
own behalf, and that in entering into this Agreement and in
executing this contract it is not relying upon any representations made by the Sellers, or by any agent or servant
thereof, except as specifically provided in this Agreement,
but upon its own opinion and judgment, and Buyer hereby
explicitly waives any claim on that account.
11.5

Sellers shall maintain in force until Closing

all insurance presently in effect.
11.6

In consideration of Buyer paying offset lia-

bilities to Claude L. Heiner and Don H. Hunter and other
partners of Western States Properties in a gross amount of
$90,000, Western States Properties shall release Western
States Coal Corporation from the obligation it now has to
pay Western States Properties $90,000 under that certain
agreement between them dated January 1, 1976.
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with copy to:
Gary Hutchinson, Manager
S. J. Groves & Sons Company
1780 South Bellaire
Denver, Colorado 80222
If to Sellers:
Claude L. Heiner and
Dan H. Hunter
2330 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah

8411$

with copies as may be directed;
or to such other address as any party may designate by
notice to the other parties as herein provided.
11.4

Buyer hereby agrees and warrants, as a part

of the consideration for the sale to it of the Net Assets as
herein provided, that it has inspected the Net Assets on its
own behalf, and that in entering into this Agreement and in
executing this contract it is not relying upon any representations made by the Sellers, or by any agent or servant
thereof, except as specifically provided in this Agreement,
but upon its own opinion and judgment, and Buyer hereby
explicitly waives any claim on that account.
11.5

Sellers shall maintain in force until Closing

all insurance presently in effect.
11.6

In consideration of Buyer paying offset lia-

bilities to Claude L. Heiner and Don H. Hunter and other
partners of Western States Properties in a gross amount of
$90,000, Western States Properties shall release Western
States Coal Corporation from the obligation it now has to
pay Western States Corporation $90,000 under that certain
.agreement between them dated January 1, 1976.
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11.7

Each of the parties hereto hereby agrees to

cooperate fully with the other in carrying out the purposes
and intent of this Agreement and in that regard to do all
acts and execute any and all documents which may reasonably
be necessary or appropriate in connection therewith.
11.8

This instrument contains the entire agree-

ment between the parties hereto with respect to the transaction contemplated herein.

This Agreement shall be gov-

erned by and construed in accordance with the laws of the
State of Utah.

Any suit for the enforcement or determina-

tion of any right or liability hereunder shall be brought
within the State of Utah.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this
Agreement as of the day and year first above written.
S. J. GROVES & SONS COMPANY,
a Minnesota corporation

/ Attorney-in-Fact
ATTEST:

WESTERN STATES COAL CORPORATION,
a Utah, corporation'

C^SyssrJL AX-• A
By CJTsss^tC
WESTERN STATES PROPERTIES,
a General Partnershii

r

General Partner
•'7
/

By <*/ sf-S-

,

^

/

^

General Partner
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AMENDMENT TO OPTION TO PURCHASE
AND PURCHASE AGREEMENT
THIS Amendment to Option to Purchase and Purchase Agreement
("Amendment") made and entered into as of October 1, 1981, by and between
Virginia Dickert and Robert Eddy ("Sellers"), and Western States Minerals
Corporation, a Utah corporation ("Buyer") .
WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, James R. Dickert and Robert Eddy, as Sellers, and
Dan H. Hunter and Claude L. Heiner, as Buyers, entered into an Option to Purchase and Purchase Agreement dated May 18, 1975 ("Agreement") , pertaining
to leases from the State of Utah, copies of the leases being designated and
referred to as SL062712, ML19231, ML1003, ML18783 and ML17687; and
WHEREAS, Virginia Dickert has succeeded to the interest of
James R. Dickert in the Agreement, and Western States Minerals Corporation
has succeeded to the interest of Dan H. Hunter tod Claude L. Heiner in the
Agreement; and
WHEREAS, Sellers contend that Buyer is in default under the
Agreement because it has not conducted mining operations since January 14,
1981, at the Dog Valley Mine, and Buyer has disputed such contention; and
WHEREAS, the Sellers and Buyer wish to settle their dispute by
amending the Agreement as herein provided.

Exhibit "C"
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NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and mutual
covenants and conditions hereinafter set forth, it is agreed that the Agreement
is amended as follows:
A.

Commencing on October 1, 1981, and on or before the first

day of each succeeding calendar month, this Agreement may be kept in full
force and effect for the next ensuing month by Buyer1 s payment to Sellers of a
minimum monthly royalty in the amount of Three Thousand Dollars ($3 f 000.00)
irrespective of whether or not Buyer shall have mined during such month a
sufficient quantity of coal at the royalty rate to equal such sum.
B.

Payment of minimum royalty shall be due on or before the firs

day of each calendar month commencing with October, 1981, and shall be paid b^
Buyer within fifteen (15) days thereafter. If Buyer shall fail to make timely or ,
proper payment of any minimum royalty payment due to Sellers hereunder, Buy<
shall then be considered in default.
C>

Payments made pursuant to paragraph A of this Amendment

(minimum monthly royalty) shall be treated as a credit against the payments ma
pursuant to paragraph 4 of the Agreement (production royalty payments) .
D.

At such time as Buyer shall have paid to Sellers, under

paragraph A of this Amendment, the total sum of $1,250,000.00 (which sum is tc
be used as a cutoff point for minimum royalty and not a purchase price), Buyer
shall have no further duty to make subsequent monthly royalty payments.

E.

Buyer1 s obligation to make minimum monthly royalty payments

pursuant to paragraph A of this Amendment, or production

royalty payments

pursuant to paragraph 4 of the Agreement shall terminate upon reassignment of
the leases to Sellers pursuant to paragraph 5 of the Agreement.
F•

Sellers waive any and all existing defaults under the Agreeme

and ratify and confirm the Agreement as herein amended.
G.

Occurrences of an event beyond the reasonable control of the

Buyer as stated in paragraph 3 of the Agreement shall not excuse Buyer from
payment of a minimum royalty of $3,000.00 per month, as set forth herein.
H.

Except as herein amended, all other terms, conditions and

covenants of the Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Amendment
in triplicate as of the day and year first qbove written.

VIRGW& DICKERT

/.'/

ROBERT EDDY
WESTERN STATES MINERALS
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation
T.
niTTST? rnnv
LOUISE
EDDY
By''-.

/*-

REED L. MARTINEAU
STEPHEN J. HILL
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Plaintiff
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR EMERY COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CLAUDE L. HEINER and
DAN H. HUNTER,
Plaintiffs,

COMPLAINT

vs.
S. J. GROVES & SONS
COMPANY, a Minnesota
c o r p o r a t i o n ; and WESTERN
STATES MINERALS CORPORATION, a Utah c o r p o r a t i o n ,

C i v i l No.

(LV-MfiftS

Defendants.

Plaintiffs allege:
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
1.

Plaintiff Claude L. Heiner is an individual residing

in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
2.

Plaintiff Dan H. Hunter is an individual residing in

Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

Exhibit "D"

3.

Defendant S. J. Groves & Sons ("S. J. Groves"), is a

Minnesota corporation with its principal place of business in
the State of Minnesota.
4.

Defendant Western States Minerals Corporation

(-Western States Minerals"), is a Utah corporation with its
principal place of business in the State of Colorado.
5.

Venue is properly laid in this judicial district

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-13-4, since this is an
action on a contract obligation which defendants were required
to perform in Emery County, State of Utah.
6.

On or about March 1, 1976, Western States Properties,

a Utah partnership, and Western States Coal Corporation, a Utah
corporation, as Sellers, and defendant S. J. Groves, as
Buyers,

entered into an agreement entitled Purchase Agreement

(a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A), whereunder
S. J. Groves purchased certain assets from Sellers, including
particularly, their interest in a coal mine located in Emery
County, Utah, commonly known as the Dog Valley Mine.

As

consideration for the purchase, S. J. Groves agreed, among
other things, to pay Western States Properties, its successors
and assigns, an overriding royalty on all coal produced and
sold from the mine by S. J. Groves in the amount of twenty (20)
cents per ton on the first 2.5 million tons and thirty (30)
cents per ton on all coal sold and produced thereafter.
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7.

Plaintiffs have succeeded to the royalty interests of

Western States Properties under the Purchase Agreement.
8.

On information and belief, S. J. Groves assigned its

interest as Buyer under the Purchase Agreement to defendant
Western States Minerals.
9.

Paragraph 1.9 of the Purchase Agreement allows the

Buyer to terminate its obligations under the agreement only for
the failure of plaintiffs to satisfy all material conditions
precedent to closing.
10.

The Sellers satisfied all material conditions

precedent to closing.
11.

Paragraph 8.3 of the Purchase Agreement requires the

Buyer to -perform and pay as and when due all obligations
required under [that certain] Option to Purchase and Purchase
Agreement dated May 28, 1975, [between plaintiffs, as Buyers,
and James R. Dickert and Robert Eddy, as Sellers],- a copy of
which is attached hereto as Exhibit B (the -Option Agreement").
11.

Paragraph 3 of the Option Agreement provides in

pertinent part as follows:
Buyers hereby agree that from and hereafter the
transfer to them of said leases they will enter onto
the subject lands and commence mining operations for
coal with reasonable dispatch and to continue such
mining operations with reasonable diligence until all
of the reasonably mineable and merchantable coal on,
in and under the subject lands has been mined, removed
and sold. Merchantable coal shall include only that
coal that can be mined, removed and s01d at a
reasonable profit.
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12.

The obligations of Paragraph 4 of the Option Agreement

are binding on defendants and require that they continue mining
operations at the Dog Valley Mine until all -merchantable coal"
is removed.
13.

Defendants have breached their duty to mine under

Paragraph 4 of the Option Agreement by ceasing mining
operations at the Dog Valley Mine during 1981, and terminating,
or at least taking steps to terminate, the underlying state
coal leases relating to the mine in 1985, without having
removed all -merchantable coal.14.

As a direct and proximate result of such breach,

plaintiffs have been and will be deprived of royalties to which
they are entitled under the Purchase Agreement.

Plaintiffs are

entitled to recover such royalties as damages in an amount to
be proven at trial, but not less than $1,000,000.00.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
15.

Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the

averments of paragraphs 1 through 14.
16.

On or about October 1, 1981, defendant Western States

Minerals entered into an agreement with Virginia Dickert and
Robert Eddy entitled -Amendment to Option to Purchase and
Purchase Agreement- (the -Amendment-) whereunder it agreed to
pay Dickert and Eddy $3000 per month until it had paid them the
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sum of $1,250,000 in order to be relieved of the obligation to
mine under the Option Agreement.
17.

Western States Minerals did not involve plaintiff in

any negotiations concerning the Amendment and gave plaintiff no
notice of the Amendment.
18.

By entering into the Amendment and suspending mining

operations, Western States Minerals breached its duty to
plaintiffs under the Purchase Agreement to extract all
-mineable coal" and pay plaintiffs royalties therefor.
19.

As a direct and proximate result of such breach,

plaintiffs have been and will be deprived of royalties to which
they are entitled under the Purchase Agreement.

Plaintiffs are

entitled to recover of defendants such royalties as damages in
an amount to be proven at trial, but not less than $1,000,000.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for the award of damages in an
amount which shall be proven at trial,but not less than
$1,000,000.00 together with their costs incurred herein,
including reasonable attorneys' fees.
DATED this 7 ^ u day o f y ^ : ( ^

, 1981?.

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

CtsL^U^
fartineau

By C&'f/L-^J'
Stephen J.

SCM1213W
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Hill

'\hj.9

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR EMERY COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
i
i

CLAUDE L. HEINER and
DAN H. HUNTER,
Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
ON MOTION TO DISMISS

)

vs.
S. J. GROVES & SONS COMPANY,
a Minnesota corporation, and
]
WESTERN STATES MINERALS
]
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation,

Civil No. 4885

Defendants.
Defendants S. J, Groves and Sons Company, and Western
States Minerals Corporation have moved the Court for an order
dismissing this case against them for failure of the Complaint
to state a cause of action.

It is the contention of the

defendants that if the facts as alleged in the Complaint are
accepted as true that the plaintiffs are not entitled to relief
as a matter of law.

The plaintiffs have filed an Objection to

the Motion and the parties have submitted their Memorandums of
Legal Points and Authorities, and the Court heard oral
arguments on the Motion on December 22, 1987, and took the
matter under advisement and rules as hereinafter stated.
The plaintiffs base their Cause of Action on two
written and duly executed contracts.

One is dated March 1,

1976, between Western States Properties, a Utah partnership,
and Western States Coal Corporation, a Utah corporation, as
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sellers, and defendant S. J. Groves as buyer.
Western States Minerals Contract)

(Referred to as

The other is an Option to

Purchase and Purchase Agreement, dated May 28, 1975, with James
R. Dickert and Robert Eddy, as sellers and the plaintiffs as
buyers. (Referred to as the Dickert Agreement)

The plaintiffs'

Complaint states that the two agreements are attached as
exhibits, but are not in the file as attachments.

However, the

parties have submitted copies of the two agreements with their
memorandums and, therefore, the Court has the contracts before
it.

The Court will assume that the various assignments of

interest as alleged in the Complaint have occurred and are true.
In the Dickert Agreement, the plaintiffs, for a cash
payment, were assigned certain coal leases and they purchased
certain equipment and Dickert and Eddy were given an over-riding
royalty on coal mined and sold from the leases and the mining
operation.

The plaintiffs, under the Agreement as stated in

Paragraph 4, were under an obligation to Dickert and Eddy to
enter on the premises and with reasonable dispatch commence
mining operations, and to continue until all reasonable minable
and merchantable coal had been mined and sold at a reasonable
profit.
Under the Western States Minerals Agreement of March
1, 1976, the defendants bought and paid for all of the net
assets of the plaintiffs in the coal leases, equipment and all
property rights obtained by them from Dickert and Eddy.
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The

allegation of the Complaint is that under the Western States
Minerals Agreement the defendants purchased the interest of
Western States Properties, a partnership, and Western States
Coal Corporation in a coal mine commonly known as Dog Valley
Mine.
An examination of that purchase agreement shows that
defendants paid $2,000,000 in cash and assumed monetary
obligations and received the complete Dog Valley mining
operation.

The agreement is explicit and not ambiguous.

One

of the sellers, Western States Properties, reserved an
over-riding royalty in the assigned coal leases on all coal
produced and sold from the leased property by defendants, its
successors and assigns. (Paragraph 3.1(b))
The plaintiffs allege, and we will assume this to be
true, that they have succeeded to the royalty interest of
Western States properties as reserved in the Western States
Mineral's Agreement.
The Western State Minerals Agreement places the duty
on defendants on behalf of Western States Properties and
Western States Minerals to "perform. . . .all obligations
required under said option to purchase and purchase agreement
dated May 28, 1975.

Buyers shall indemnify and hold harmless

sellers from all and any claims, suits, and liabilities
relating thereto arising from acts or defaults of buyer
(defendants) from and after closing".
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By such a provision, it is obvious that defendants
were required, and became obligated to Dickert and Eddy to
enter onto the subject land and commence mining operations and
to continue such mining operations as long as it could be done
profitably.

This obligation was one owed to Dickert and Eddy

and was not restated as an obligation to Western States
Properties in the March 1, 1976 Agreement.
The Complaint alleges that the defendants satisfied
this obligation to mine with Dickert and Eddy by entering into
a separate agreement with them and paying them a cash consideration.
The plaintiffs are alleging a duty on the part of
the defendants to perform mining that is not owed to them and
which does not exist and is not set forth in either of the
Agreements relied upon.

The Agreements clearly state that the

defendants owed a duty to mine to Dickert and Eddy, and owed a
duty to the plaintiffs to pay a royalty on all coal mined and
produced by them.

The defendants, as stated in the Complaint,

have satisfied the obligation to Dickert and Eddy and have
ceased mining and have produced and sold no coal so that no
royalty is owing.
The Court quite agrees with the reasoning set forth
in the case of Piamco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Company handed to the
Court by counsel for the plaintiffs at oral arguments and which
case is a Federal case from the Seventh Circuit.

In that case

the Court found and stated that there can be no doubt that as a
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general matter over-riding royalty obligations end with the
termination of the estate from which the interests were carved,
absent an express contractual provision to the contrary.

The

Court went on to state that the Agreement between these parties
itself manifest a clear intention to bind Shell to make such
royalty payments regardless of the fate of the undermining
leases.
In this casef we have no clear intention stated in
the Agreement that this would be the case.
On the contrary, the Agreement is very clear and
unambiguous that the royalty that may due to the plaintiffs
will be paid on all coal mined and sold by the defendants or
its assigns.

There was no express agreement to pay any sort of

a minimum or to continue mining idefinitely as contended by the
plaintiffs.
Based upon the alleged facts in the Complaint, the
Court finds that the plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of
action upon which relief can be granted and, therefore, grants
the Motion to Dismiss.
The Court directs that the Attorney for the
defendants prepare a formal order to this affect.
DATED this

J^-. 5-~ day of December, 1987.
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